Regarda fonte per Metafisica

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[[File:Aristotle, Metaphysics, Incunabulum.jpg|thumb|alt=Incunabulum showing the beginning of Aristotle's ''Metaphysics''| La comensa de la [[Metafisica (Aristotele)|''Metafisica'' de Aristotele]], un de la testos fundal de la campo]]

'''Metafisica''' es la ramo de [[filosofia]] cual esamina la strutur fundal de [[realia]]. Lo es frecuente nomida la '''filosofia prima''', cual sujesta ce lo es plu fundal ca otra formas de investiga filosofial. Metafisica es tradisional videda como la studia de cualias de la mundo nondependente de la mente, ma alga teoristes moderna comprende lo como un investiga de la scemas consetal cual suporta la pensa e esperia umana.

Multe temas jeneral e astrata parteni a la sujeto de metafisica. Lo investiga la natur de es, la cualias cual tota cosas ave en comun, e sua divide en categorias. Un contrasta influente es entre [[Spesifada|spesifadas]], cual es cosas individua e unica, como un poma spesifada, e [[Universal (metafisica)|universales]], cual es cosas jeneral e repetable cual distingui spesifadas, como la color roja. [[Metafisica modal]] esamina cual lo sinifia ce alga cosa es posible o nesesada. La [[Filosfia de spasio e tempo|natur de spasio, tempo e cambia]] es ance discuteda par metafisicistes. Un tema prosima relatada conserna la esense de [[causalia]] e sua relata a la [[Lege siensal|leges de natur]]. Otra temas inclui como mente e materia es relatada, esce tota en la mundo es [[Determinisme|predeterminada]], e esce on ave [[volunta libre]].

Metafisicistes emplea metodos variosa per condui sua investiga. Tradisional, los depende de [[Intui|intuis]] razonal e [[Razona lojical|razona]] [[Astrati|astrata]] ma plu resente inclui ance prosimis [[Demostra empirical|empirical]] asosiada con teorias siensal. Par causa de la natur astrata de sua tema, metafisica reseta criticas cual espresa duta sur la fidablia de sua metodos e la sinifia de sua teorias. Metafisica es pertinente a multe campos de investiga cual depende frecuente nondireta de consetas e suposas metafisical.

La [[Istoria de metafisica|orijina de metafisica]] es en la [[eda antica]] con divinas sur la natur de realia e la universo, como trovada en la [[Upanixades]] en [[Barat antica]], dauisme en [[Istoria de Xina|Xina antica]], e [[filosofia presocratiste]] en [[Elas antica]]. La [[Eda medieval|periodo medieval]] seguente en la Ueste ia discute la [[Problem de universales|natur de universales]] como formulada par la filosofistes elinica antica [[Platon]] e [[Aristotele]]. La [[Eda moderna|periodo moderna]] ia vide la emerji de sistemes variosa e completa de metafisica, multe de cual ia aseta [[idealisme]]. En la sentenio 20 e la periodo [[Filosofia contempora|contempora]], un "revolta contra idealisme" ia aveni, e metafisica ia es a un ves declarada como sin sinifia, alora reviveda con criticas variosa de teorias plu temprana e prosimis nova a la investiga metafisical. 

== Definis ==
Metafisica es la studia de la cualias la plu jeneral de realia, cual inclui [[Esiste (state)|esiste]], [[Ojeto|ojetos]] e sua [[Cualia (filosofia)|cualias]], posiblia e nesesadia, [[spasio]] e [[tempo]], cambia, [[causalia]], e la relata entre [[materia]] e [[mente]]. Lo es un de la ramos la plu vea de [[filosofia]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Carroll|Markosian|2010|pp=1–3}} | {{harvnb|Koons|Pickavance|2015|pp=1–2}} | {{harvnb|McDaniel|2020|loc=§ 0.3 An Overview of Metaphysics and Other Areas of Philosophy}} | {{harvnb|Mumford|2012|loc=§ What Is an Introduction?}} }}</ref>

La natur esata de metafisica es disputada e sua defini ia cambia en la curso de istoria. Alga prosimis vide metafisica como un campo unida e dona un defini vasta par comprende lo como la studia de "demandas fundal sur la natur de realia" o como un investiga de la [[Esense|esenses]] de cosas. Un otra prosimi duta ce la areas diferente de metafisica comparti un colie de cualias fundal e furni en loca un defini refinada par lista tota la temas xef investigada par metafisicistes.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Carroll|Markosian|2010|pp=1–4}} | {{harvnb|Loux|Crisp|2017|pp=1–2}} | {{harvnb|McDaniel|2020|loc=§ 0.3 An Overview of Metaphysics and Other Areas of Philosophy}} | {{harvnb|Mumford|2012|loc=§ 10 What Is Metaphysics?}} | {{harvnb|Ney|2014|pp=9–10}} | {{harvnb|van Inwagen|Sullivan|Bernstein|2023|loc=Lead Section, § 1. The Word 'Metaphysics' and the Concept of Metaphysics}} }}</ref> Alga definis es descrivente par furni un conta de cual metafisicistes fa e otras es norminte e prescrive cual metafisicistes debe fa.<ref>{{harvnb|Loux|Crisp|2017|p=2}}</ref>

Du definis istorial influente en [[filosofia antica]] e [[filosofia medieval|medieval]] comprende metafisica como la siensa de la [[causa prima|causas prima]] e como la studia de es ''qua'' es, per dise, la tema de cual tota cosas ave en comun e a cual categorias fundal los parteni. En la periodo moderna, la estende de metafisica ia estende per covre temas como la distingui entre mente e corpo e [[volunta libre]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Loux|Crisp|2017|pp=1–4}} | {{harvnb|van Inwagen|Sullivan|Bernstein|2023|loc=Lead Section, § 1. The Word 'Metaphysics' and the Concept of Metaphysics}} }}</ref> Alga filosofistes segue [[Aristotele]] en descrive metafisica como "filosofia prima", cual sujesta ce lo es la investiga la plu fundal e ce tota otra ramos de filosofia depende de lo en alga modo.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Koons|Pickavance|2015|pp=8–10}} | {{harvnb|Loux|Crisp|2017|pp=2–3}} }}</ref>{{efn|Per esemplo, la problem metafisical de causalia es pertinente a ambos [[epistemolojia]], como un fator envolveda en sabe persepal, e [[etica]], en relata con respondosia moral per la resultas causada par la [[Ata (filosofia)|atas]] de un person.<ref>{{harvnb|Koons|Pickavance|2015|pp=8–10}}</ref>}}

[[File:Kant gemaelde 1.jpg|thumb|alt=Depinta de Immanuel Kant|[[Immanuel Kant]] ia conseta metafisica critica como la studia de la prinsipes cual suporta tota pensa e esperia umana.]]

Metafisica es tradisional comprendeda como un studia de cualias de realia nondependente de la mente. Comensante con la [[filosofia critica]] de [[Immanuel Kant]], un conseta alternativa ia gania importa cual foca a scemas consetal en loca de realia esterna. Kant distingui metafisica transendente, cual atenta descrive la cualias ojetal de realia ultra esperia sensal, de metafisica critica, cual descrive la aspetas e prinsipes cual suporta tota pensa e esperia umana.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Loux|Crisp|2017|pp=1–2, 6}} | {{harvnb|Bengtson|2015|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=pUHvCgAAQBAJ&pg=PT35 35]}} | {{harvnb|Wood|2009|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=i7PG-Vk824UC&pg=PA354 354]}} }}</ref> En relata con la analise de scemas consetal, la filosofiste [[P. F. Strawson]] contrasta metafisica descrivente, cual espresa scemas consetal comun usada per comprende la mundo, con metafisica revisante, cual atenta produi scemas consetal plu bon.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Phillips|1967|pp=105–106}} | {{harvnb|Haack|1979|pp=361–362}} | {{harvnb|MacDonald|2008|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=JjRG56XeyIcC&pg=PA21 21]}} }}</ref>

Metafisica difere de la siensas individua par studia aspetas multe jeneral e astrata de realia. La siensas individua, en contrasta, esamina cualias plu spesifada e concreta e restrinje se a alga clases de cosas, como la foca a cosas fisical en [[fisica]], cosas vivente en [[biolojia]], e cultures en [[antropolojia]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Mumford|2012|loc=§ 10 What Is Metaphysics?}} | {{harvnb|Ney|2014|p=xiii}} | {{harvnb|Tahko|2015|pp=206–207}} }}</ref> Lo es disputada a cual grado esta contrasta es un dicotomia sever en loca de un continua gradal.<ref>{{harvnb|Tahko|2015|pp=203–205}}</ref>

Filosofistes trata metafisica es nomida ''metafisicistes''. Estra discutes academial, la terma ''metafisica'' es a veses usada per sinifia la studia de fenomenos [[oculta]] e [[paranormal]], como cura metafisical, [[aura]]s, e la [[potia de piramides]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Carroll|Markosian|2010|p=1}} | {{harvnb|Turner|1911|loc=[[:s:Catholic_Encyclopedia_(1913)/Metaphysics]]}} }}</ref>

=== Etimolojia ===

La parola "metafisica" ave sua orijina en la parolas elinica antica ''metá'' (μετά, sinifiante 'pos', 'supra', e 'ultra') e ''phusiká'' (φυσικά) como un forma corta de ta metá ta phusiká: pd, lo cual veni pos la fisica. Esta es frecuente interpreteda per sinifia ce metafisica discute temas cual, par causa de sua jeneralia e completia, es ultra la rena de fisica e sua foca a oserva empirical.<ref name=":0"/> Metafisica ia oteni sua nom par un asidente istorial<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Pols|1993|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=sv84Gi7C9jgC&pg=PA203 203]}} | {{harvnb|White|2017|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=dCWEDgAAQBAJ&pg=PT33 33]}} | {{harvnb|Lowe|2013|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=Las3AAAAQBAJ&pg=PA127 127]}} }}</ref> cuando la [[Metafisica (Aristotele)|libro de Aristotele]] sur esta tema ia es publicida. Aristotele no ia usa la terma metafisica ma lo es posible ce sua editor (probable [[Andronico de Rodos]]) ia crea lo per sua titulo per indica ce on debe studia esta libro pos la libro de Aristotele publicida sur [[Fisica (Aristotele)|fisica]]: leteral "pos fisica".<ref name=":0">{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hoad|1993|pp=291, 351}} | {{harvnb|Cohen|Reeve|2021|loc=Lead Section}} | {{harvnb|Carroll|Markosian|2010|pp=1–2}} | {{harvnb|Mumford|2012|loc=§ 10. What Is Metaphysics?}} | {{harvnb|Veldsman|2017|pp=1–2}} | {{harvnb|Heidegger|1996|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=zqXDDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA39 39]}} | {{harvnb|Politis|2004|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=d-GjOoZNnGsC&pg=PA1 1]}} }}</ref>

=== Ramos ===

La natur de metafisica pote ance es descriveda en relata con sua ramos xef. Un divide influente de la [[filosofia moderna]] temprana distingui entre metafisica jeneral e metafisica spesial o spesifada.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Loux|Crisp|2017|pp=3–5, 10}} | {{harvnb|van Inwagen|Sullivan|Bernstein|2023|loc=§ 1. The Word 'Metaphysics' and the Concept of Metaphysics}} | {{harvnb|Craig|1998}} | {{harvnb|Koons|Pickavance|2015|pp=1–2}} }}</ref> Metafisica jeneral, ance nomida ''[[ontolojia]]'',{{efn|La terma ''[[ontolojia]]'' es a veses ance usada como un sinonim de metafisica ''in toto''.<ref>{{harvnb|Hawley|2016|p=166}}</ref>}} adota la perspetiva la plu larga e studia la aspetas la plu fundal de es. Lo investiga la cualias cual tota cosas ave en comun e como cosas pote es divideda en categorias diferente. Categorias es la tipos la plu jeneral, como sustantia, cualia, [[relata (filosofia)|relata]], e [[fato]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Loux|Crisp|2017|pp=10–14}} | {{harvnb|van Inwagen|Sullivan|Bernstein|2023|loc=§ 1. The Word 'Metaphysics' and the Concept of Metaphysics}} | {{harvnb|Campbell|2006|loc=The Categories Of Being}} }}</ref> Ontolojistes rexerca cual categorias esiste, como los depende de lunlotra, e como los formi un sistem de categorias cual furni un clasi incluinte de tota cosas.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hofweber|2023|loc=§ 3. Ontology}} | {{harvnb|Campbell|2006|loc=The Categories Of Being}} | {{harvnb|Thomasson|2022|loc=Lead Section}} }}</ref>

Metafisica spesial considera es de perspetivas plu streta e es divideda en sucampos fundida sur la perspetiva cual los prende. [[Cosmolojia]] metafisical esamina cosas cambiable e investiga como los es liada per formi un [[mundo]] como un totalia de cosas cual estende tra spasio e tempo.<ref name="Loux 2017 3–5, 10">{{multiref | {{harvnb|Loux|Crisp|2017|pp=3–5, 10}} | {{harvnb|van Inwagen|Sullivan|Bernstein|2023|loc=§ 1. The Word 'Metaphysics' and the Concept of Metaphysics}} }}</ref> Psicolojia razonal limita se a esplora fundas e problemes metafisical consernante la mente, como sua relata con materia e la libria de la volunta. Teolojia natural studia la divin e sua rol como la causa prima.<ref name="Loux 2017 3–5, 10"/> La estende de metafisica spesial covre partal sujetos de otra disiplinas filosofial e lo es frecuente nonclar esce un tema parteni a lo en loca de disiplinas como [[filosofia de mente]] e [[teolojia]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Loux|Crisp|2017|pp=10–11}} | {{harvnb|Craig|1998|loc=§ 2. Specific Metaphysics}} }}</ref>

Metafisica aplicada es un sucampo joven. Lo parteni a [[filosofia aplicada]] e studia la aplicas de metafisica, ambos en filosofia e otra campos de investiga. En [[etica]] e [[filosofia de relijio]], lo conserna temas como la funda ontolojial de afirmas moral e dotrinas relijiosa.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hawley|2016|pp=165–168}} | {{harvnb|Brumbaugh|1966|pp=[https://www.jstor.org/stable/20124133 647–648]}} }}</ref> Aplicas estra filosofia inclui la usa de ontolojias en [[inteleto artifis]], [[economia]], e [[sosiolojia]] per clasi cosas<ref>{{harvnb|Hawley|2016|pp=168–169, 171–172}}</ref> e ance demandas en [[psiciatria]] e [[medica]] sur la state metafisical de [[maladia]]s.<ref>{{harvnb|Hawley|2016|p=174}}</ref>

'''Metametafisica'''{{efn|Alga filosofistes usa la terma ''[[metaontolojia]]'' como un sinonim ma otras descrive metaontolojia como un sucampo de metametafisica.<ref>{{harvnb|Tahko|2018|loc=Lead Section}}</ref>}} es la [[metateoria]] de metafisica e investiga la natur e metodos de metafisica. Lo esamina ance como metafisica difere de otra campos filosofial e siensal e como lo es pertinente a los. An con ce la discutes de sua temas ave un istoria longa en metafisica, lo ia  developa sola resente a un campo sistemosa de investiga.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|McDaniel|2020|loc=§ 7 Meta-metaphysics}} | {{harvnb|Tahko|2018|loc=Lead Section}} }}</ref>

== Temas ==
=== Esiste e categorias ===

Metafisicistes frecuente vide esiste o es como un de la consetas la plu fundal e jeneral.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Lowe|2005|p=[https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/acref/9780199264797.001.0001/acref-9780199264797-e-828 277]}} | {{harvnb|White|2019|pp=135, 200}} | {{harvnb|Gibson|1998|pp=1–2}} | {{harvnb|Jubien|2004|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=uoCh8mpbZO4C&pg=PA47 47–48]}} | {{harvnb|Vallicella|2010|p=16}} }}</ref> Esiste sinifia formi un parte de [[realia]] e esiste marca la difere entre cosas real e los imajinal.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Lowe|2005|p=[https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/acref/9780199264797.001.0001/acref-9780199264797-e-828 277]}} | {{harvnb|AHD staff|2022}} }}</ref> Seguente la vista ortodox, esiste es un cualia de ordina du o un cualia de cualias: si un cosa esiste alora sua cualias es instansida.<ref>{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Casati|Fujikawa|loc=Lead Section, §1. Existence as a Second-Order Property and Its Relation to Quantification}} |2={{harvnb|Blackburn|2008|loc=[https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803095804522;jsessionid=AEB41DBFF0B3EBCDCCB8A1E0DAFD4EB0 existence]}} }}</ref> Un vista diferente afirma ce esiste es un cualia de ordina un, sinifiante ce lo es simil a otra cualias de cosas, como forma o grandia.<ref>{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Casati|Fujikawa|loc=Lead Section, §2. Existence as a First-Order Property and Its Relation to Quantification}} |2={{harvnb|Blackburn|2008|loc=[https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803095804522;jsessionid=AEB41DBFF0B3EBCDCCB8A1E0DAFD4EB0 existence]}} }}</ref> Esce tota cosas ave esta cualia es controversa. Seguente [[Alexius Meinong]], on ave [[ojeto nonesistente|ojetos nonesistente]], incluinte ojetos mera posible como [[Papa Natal]] e [[Pegaso]].<ref name="auto">{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Van Inwagen|2023}} |2={{harvnb|Nelson|2022|loc=Lead Section, §2. Meinongianism}} |3={{harvnb|Jubien|2004|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=uoCh8mpbZO4C&pg=PA49 49]}} }}</ref>{{efn|Seguente Meinong, esiste no es un sinonim de es: tota cosas ave es ma no tota cosas ave esiste.<ref name="auto"/>}} Un demanda relatada es esce esiste es la mesma per tota cosas o esce on ave modos o grados diferente de esiste.<ref>{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Casati|Fujikawa|loc=Lead Section, §3. How Many Ways of Being Existent?}} |2={{harvnb|McDaniel|2017|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=8F0vDwAAQBAJ&pg=PT89 77]}} }}</ref> Per esemplo, Platon ia crede ce la [[teoria de formas|formas platonica]], cual es ideas perfeta e nonmutable, ave un grado plu alta de esiste ca materia, cual es capas sola de nonperfeta refleta la formas platonica.<ref>{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Poidevin|Peter|Andrew|Cameron|2009|pp=227–228}} |2={{harvnb|Van Inwagen|2023}} }}</ref>

Un otra conserna clavin en metafisica es la divide de cosas en grupos diferente fundida sur cualias fundal cual los ave en comun. Teorias de categorias furni un sistem de la tipos la plu fundal o la jeneros la plu alta de es par crea un lista completa de tota.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Thomasson|2022|loc=Lead Section}} | {{harvnb|Loux|Crisp|2017|pp=11–12}} | {{harvnb|Wardy|1998|loc=Lead Section}} }}</ref> Un de la teorias la plu temprana de categorias ia es furnida par Aristotele, ci ia proposa un [[Categorias (Aristotele)|sistem de 10 categorias]]. [[Sustantia (filosofia)|Sustantias]] (pe om e cavalo), es la categoria la plu importante car tota otra categorias como [[cuantia]] (pe cuatro), [[cualia]] (pe blanca), e loca (pe en Atina) es diseda de sustantias e depende de los.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Thomasson|2022|loc=§ 1.1 Aristotelian Realism}} | {{harvnb|Studtmann|2024|loc=§ 2. The Ten-Fold Division}} | {{harvnb|Wardy|1998|loc=§ 1. Categories in Aristotle}} }}</ref> Kant ia comprende categorias como prinsipes fundal cual suporta la comprende umana e ia developa un [[Categoria (Kant)|sistem de 12 categorias]], cual es divideda en la cuatro clases cuantia, cualia, relata, e modalia.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Thomasson|2022|loc=§ 1.2 Kantian Conceptualism}} | {{harvnb|Wardy|1998|loc=§ 1. Categories in Kant}} }}</ref> Teorias plu resente de categorias ia es proposada par [[C. S. Peirce]], [[Edmund Husserl]], [[Samuel Alexander]], [[Roderick Chisholm]], e [[E. J. Lowe]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Thomasson|2022|loc=§ 1.3 Husserlian Descriptivism, § 1.4 Contemporary Category Systems}} | {{harvnb|Grim|Rescher|2023|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=KgPPEAAAQBAJ&pg=PT39 39]}} }}</ref> Multe filosofistes depende de la contrasta entre [[astrata e contreta|ojetos concreta e astrata]]. Seguente un vista comun, ojetos concreta, como rocas, arbores, e umanas, esiste en spasio e tempo, esperia cambias, e afeta lunlotra como causa e efeto, ma ojetos astrata, como [[numero]]s e [[colie]]s, esiste estra spasio e tempo, es nonmutable, e no entra a relatas causal.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Falguera|Martínez-Vidal|Rosen|2022|loc=Lead Section, § 1. Introduction, § 3.5 The Ways of Negation}} | {{harvnb|Erasmus|2018|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=ze5FDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA93 93]}} | {{harvnb|Macnamara|2009|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=pvKD5fvyLXIC&pg=PA94 94]}} }}</ref>

=== Spesifadas ===

[[Spesifada]]s es cosas individua e inclui ambos ojetos concreta, como Aristotele, la Tore Eiffel, o un poma spesifada, e ojetos astrata, como la numero 2 o un colie spesifada en matematica. Los es cosas unica e nonrepetable e contrasta con [[universal]]es, como la color roja, cual pote a la mesma tempo esiste en alga locas e marca alga spesifadas.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Lowe|2005|p=683}} | {{harvnb|MacLeod|Rubenstein|loc=Lead Section, § 1a. The Nature of Universals}} | {{harvnb|Bigelow|1998|loc=Lead Section}} | {{harvnb|Campbell|2006|loc=§ Particularity and Individuality}} | {{harvnb|Maurin|2019|loc=Lead Section}} }}</ref> Un vista vasta  pensada es ce spesifadas instansi universales ma no es se mesma instansida par alga cosa, sinifiante ce los esiste en se mesma ma universales esiste en alga cosa. La teoria de sustrato analise spesifadas como un sustrato, ance nomida un spesifada nuda, con alga cualias. La sustrato dona individualia a la spesifada ma la cualias espresa sua cualias cualial o como lo es. Esta prosimi es rejetada par [[teoria de faxos|teoristes de faxos]], ci afirma ce spesifadas es sola faxos de cualias sin un sustrato fundal. Alga teoristes de faxos inclui en la faxo un esense individua, nomida ''[[haecceitas]]'', per serti ce cada faxo es unica. Un otra proposa per spesifadas concreta es ce los es individualida par sua loca en spasiotempo.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Maurin|2019|loc=Lead Section}} | {{harvnb|Campbell|2006|loc=§ Particularity and Individuality}} | {{harvnb|Bigelow|1998|loc=Lead Section, § 3. Bundles of Properties}} | {{harvnb|Loux|Crisp|2017|pp=82–83}} }}</ref>

Spesifadas concreta encontrada en la vive dial, como rocas, tables, e organismes, es cosas complicada composada de partes variosa. Per esemplo, un table es composada de un surfas de table e gamas, cada de cual es se mesma composada de spesifadas nonumerable. La relata entre partes e interas es studiada par [[merolojia]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Loux|Crisp|2017|pp=250–251}} | {{harvnb|Varzi|2019|loc=Lead Section, § 1. 'Part' and Parthood}} | {{harvnb|Cornell|loc=Lead Section, § 2. The Special Composition Question}} | {{harvnb|Tallant|2017|pp=19–21}} }}</ref> La problem de la multe es sur cual grupos de cosas formi interas merolojial, per esemplo, esce un particula de polvo sur la surfas de table formi un parte de la table. Seguente universalistes merolojial, cada colie de cosas formi un intera, sinifiante ce la partes de la table sin la particula de polvo formi un intera ma los con lo formi un intera du. Moderadistes merolojial crede ce alga nesesadas debe es sasiada per un grupo de cosas composa un intera, per esemplo, ce la cosas toca lunlotra. [[nihilisme meolojial|Nihilistes merolojial]] rejeta la idea ce on ave cualce interas. Seguente los, on ave no tables e sejas ma sola spesifadas cual es ordinada en modo de table e en modo de seja.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Loux|Crisp|2017|pp=82–83}} | {{harvnb|Cornell|loc=Lead Section, § 2. The Special Composition Question}} | {{harvnb|Brenner|2015|p=1295}} | {{harvnb|Tallant|2017|pp=19–21, 23–24, 32–33}} }}</ref> Un problem merolojial relatada es esce on ave cosas simple cual ave no partes, como [[atomisme|atomistes]] afirma, o no, como teoristes de continua argumenta.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Berryman|2022|loc=§ 2.6 Atomism and Particle Theories in Ancient Greek Sciences}} | {{harvnb|Varzi|2019|loc=§ 3.4 Atomism, Gunk, and Other Options}} }}</ref>

=== Universales ===

Universales es cosas jeneral, incluinte ambos [[cualia]]s e [[relata]]s, cual espresa como spesifadas es e como los sembla lunlotra. Los es repetable, sinifiante ce los no es limitada a un esistente unica ma pote es instansida par particulas diferente a la mesma tempo. Per esemplo, la particulas [[Nelson Mandela]] e [[Mahatma Gandhi]] instansi la universal ''umania'', simil a como un frambosa e un rubi instansi la universal ''roja''.

Un tema discuteda de filosofia antica, la problem de universales es la difisilia de descrive la state ontolojial de universales.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|MacLeod|Rubenstein|loc=Lead Section, § 1c. The Problem of Universals}} | {{harvnb|Rodriguez-Pereyra|2000|pp=255–256}} | {{harvnb|Loux|Crisp|2017|pp=17–19}} }}</ref> Realistes argumenta ce universales es cosas real e nondependente de la mente cual esiste en ajunta a spesifadas. Seguente realistes platonica, universales esiste ance nondependente de spesifadas, cual implica ce la universal ''roja'' ta continua esiste an si on ta ave no cosas roja. Un forma plu moderada de realisme, inspirada par Aristotele, afirma ce universales depende de spesifadas, sinifiante ce los es sola real si los es instansida. [[Nominalisme|Nominalistes]] rejeta la idea ce universales esiste en cualce forma. Per los, la mundo es sola composada de spesifadas. La vista de [[consetalisme|consetalistes]] representa un punto media: los afirma ce universales esiste, ma sola como [[conseta]]s en la mente usada per ordina esperia par clasi cosas.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|MacLeod|Rubenstein|loc=Lead Section, § 2. Versions of Realism, § 3. Versions of Anti-Realism}} | {{harvnb|Bigelow|1998a|loc=§ 4. Nominalism and Realism}} | {{harvnb|Loux|Crisp|2017|pp=17–19, 45}} }}</ref>

[[Tipo natural|Tipos natural]] e sosial es frecuente comprendeda como tipos spesial de universales. Cosas cual parteni a la mesma tipo natural comparti alga cualias fundal cual marca la strutur de la mundo natural. En esta modo, tipos natural no es un clasi artifis creada ma es descovreda,{{efn|La cosas clasida no nesesa aveni natural e pote inclui produidas artifis, como cimicales sintesal.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Brzović|loc=Lead Section}} | {{harvnb|Bird|Tobin|2024|loc=Lead Section}} }}</ref>}} tipal par la siensas natural, e inclui tipos como [[eletron]]es, [[acua|H<sub>2</sub>O]], e [[tigre]]s. [[Realisme siensal|Realistes siensal]] e antirealistes no acorda esce tipos natural esiste.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Brzović|loc=Lead Section, § 3. Metaphysics of Natural Kinds}} | {{harvnb|Bird|Tobin|2024|loc=Lead Section, § 1.2 Natural Kind Realism}} | {{harvnb|Liston|loc=Lead Section}} }}</ref> Tipos sosial es studiada par [[ontolojia sosial|metafisica sosial]] e es descriveda como construis sosial usosa cual, an si no pur imajinal, fali refleta la strutur fundal de realia nondependente de la mente.<ref>{{multiref|{{harvnb|Ney|2014|pp=259–263}}|{{harvnb|Rea|2021|pp=185–186}}}}</ref> Esemplos noncontroversa inclui [[mone]] o [[basebal]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Ásta|2017|pp=[https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781315768571-27/social-kinds-%C3%A1sta 290–291]}} | {{harvnb|Bird|Tobin|2024|loc=§ 2.4 Natural Kinds and Social Science}} }}</ref>

=== Posibilia e nesesadia ===

La consetas de posiblia e nesesadia comunica cual pote o nesesa es la caso, espresada en declaras como "lo es posible per trova un cura per canser" e "lo es nesesada ce du plu du egali cuatro". Los parteni a metafisica modal, cual investiga la prinsipes metafisical cual suporta los, spesial, perce lo es la caso ce alga declaras modal es vera ma otras es falsa.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Parent|loc=Lead Section}} | {{harvnb|Loux|Crisp|2017|pp=149–150}} | {{harvnb|Koons|Pickavance|2015|pp=154–155}} | {{harvnb|Mumford|2012|loc=§ 8. What Is Possible?}} }}</ref>{{efn|Un otra tema conserna tipos diferente de modalia, como la contrasta entre nesesadia fisical, metafisical, e lojical, fundida sur esce la nesesadia ave sua fonte en la [[lege siensal|leges de natur]], la esenses de cosas, o la leges de lojica.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hanna|2009|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=ka9BhOL1ev8C&pg=PA196 196]}} | {{harvnb|Hale|2020|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=OSvsDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA142 142]}} }}</ref>}} Alga metafisicistes crede ce modalia es un aspeta fundal de realia, sinifiante ce estra fatos sur lo cual es la caso, on ave fatos ajuntada sur lo cual pote o nesesa es la caso.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Goswick|2018|pp=97–98}} | {{harvnb|Wilsch|2017|pp=428–429, 446}} }}</ref> Un vista diferente argumenta ce verias modal no es sur un aspeta nondependente de realia ma pote es reduida a cualias nonmodal, per esemplo, a fatos sur cual cualias o descrives lingual es acordable con lunlotra o a declaras imajinal.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Goswick|2018|pp=97–98}} | {{harvnb|Parent|loc=§ 3. Ersatzism, § 4. Fictionalism}} | {{harvnb|Wilsch|2017|pp=428–429}} }}</ref>

Emprestante un terma de la [[teodisia]] de la filosofiste deutx [[Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz]], multe metafisicistes usa la conseta de [[mundo posible|mundos posible]] per analise la sinifia e la resultas ontolojial de declaras modal. Un mundo posible es un modo completa e coerente de como cosas ia ta es.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Menzel|2023|loc=Lead Section, § 1. Possible Worlds and Modal Logic}} | {{harvnb|Berto|Jago|2023|loc=Lead Section}} | {{harvnb|Pavel|1986|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=OF7ZA54UpYYC&pg=PA50 50]}} | {{harvnb|Campbell|2006|loc=§ Possible Worlds}} }}</ref> Per esemplo, la [[dinosauro]]s ia es eliminada en la mundo vera ma on ave mundos posible en cual los es ancora vivente.<ref>{{harvnb|Nuttall|2013|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=luc-Hf_bEOIC&pg=PT135 135]}}</ref> Seguente semantica de mundos posible, un declara es posible vera si lo es vera en a la min un mundo posible ma lo es nesesada vera si lo es vera en tota mundos posible.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Menzel|2023|loc=Lead Section, § 1. Possible Worlds and Modal Logic}} | {{harvnb|Kuhn|2010|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=c_eYe6NVaDMC&pg=PA13 13]}} }}</ref> [[Realisme modal|Realistes modal]] argumenta ce mundos posible esiste como cosas concreta en la mesma sensa como la mundo vera, con la difere xef esente ce la mundo vera es la mundo en cual nos vive ma otra mundos posible es abitada par [[teoria de duales|duales]]. Esta vista es controversa e alternativas variosa ia es sujestada, per esemplo, ce mundos posible esiste sola como ojetos astrata o ce los es simil a naras contada en obras de nara.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Parent|loc=Lead Section, § 2. Lewis' Realism, § 3. Ersatzism, § 4. Fictionalism}} | {{harvnb|Menzel|2023|loc=Lead Section, § 2. Three Philosophical Conceptions of Possible Worlds}} | {{harvnb|Campbell|2006|loc=§ Modal Realism}} }}</ref>

=== Spasio, tempo e cambia ===

[[Spasio]] e [[tempo]] es dimensiones cual cosas ocupa. Realistes de spasiotempo afirma ce spasio e tempo es aspetas fundal de realia e esiste nondependente de la mente umana. Esta vista es rejetada par idealistes de spasiotempo, ci crede ce spasio e tempo es construis de la mente umana en sua atenta per organiza e comprende realia.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Dainton|2010|pp=[https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/abs/time-and-space/spatial-antirealism/CE284C8D3088AF598998951618D4867D 245–246]}} | {{harvnb|Janiak|2022|loc=§ 4.2 Absolute/Relational Vs. Real/Ideal}} | {{harvnb|Pelczar|2015|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=tkjTBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA115 115]}} }}</ref> Asolutisme o sustantialisme de spasiotempo comprende spasiotempo como un ojeto diferente, con alga metafisicistes consetante lo como un caxa cual conteni tota otra cosas en lo. [[Relatisme spasiotempal]], en contrasta, vide spasiotempo no como un ojeto ma como relatas entre ojetos, como la relata spasial de ''es a lado de'' e la relata tempal de ''veni ante''.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hoefer|Huggett|Read|2023|loc=Lead Section}} | {{harvnb|Benovsky|2016|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=4KHWCwAAQBAJ&pg=PA19 19–20]}} | {{harvnb|Romero|2018|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=5wJ2DwAAQBAJ&pg=PA135 135]}} }}</ref>

En la metafisica de tempo, un contrasta importante es entre la [[serie A e seria B|serie A e la serie B]]. Seguente la teoria de la serie A, la [[flue de tempo]] es real, sinifiante ce avenis es categorida como la pasada, la presente, e la futur. La presente continua move a ante en tempo e avenis cual es en la presente aora va cambia sua state e es en la pasada plu tarda. De la perspetiva de la teoria de la serie B, tempo es statical e avenis es ordinada par la relatas tempal plu temprana ca e plu tarda ca sin cualce difere esensal entre la pasada, la presente, e la futur.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Dyke|2002|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=IxIlqbSWg4gC&pg=PA138 138]}} | {{harvnb|Koons|Pickavance|2015|pp=182–185}} | {{harvnb|Carroll|Markosian|2010|pp=160–161}} }}</ref> [[Eternalisme (filosofia de tempo)|Eternalisme]] afirma ce la pasada, la presente, e la futur es egal real ma seguente [[Presentisme (filosofia de tempo)|presentistes]], sola cosas en la presente esiste.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Carroll|Markosian|2010|pp=179–181}} | {{harvnb|Loux|Crisp|2017|pp=206, 214–215}} | {{harvnb|Romero|2018|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=5wJ2DwAAQBAJ&pg=PA135 135]}} }}</ref>

Ojetos material persiste tra tempo e cambia en la prosede, como un arbor cual crese o perde folias.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Miller|2018|loc=Lead Section}} | {{harvnb|Costa|loc=Lead Section}} | {{harvnb|Simons|2013|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=ql27m77IveQC&pg=PA166 166]}} }}</ref> La modos xef de conseta la persiste tra tempo es [[endurantisme]] e [[perdurantisme]]. Seguente endurantisme, ojetos material es cosas tridimensional cual es intera presente a cada momento. Cuando los cambia, los gania o perde cualias ma resta la mesma en otra modos. Perdurantistes vide ojetos material como cosas cuatrodimensional cual estende tra tempo e es composada de [[partes tempal]] diferente. A cada momento, sola un parte de la ojeto es presente ma no la ojeto intera. Cambia sinifia ce un parte plu temprana es cualial diferente de un parte plu tarda. Per esemplo, si un banana maturi alora on ave un parte nonmatur segueda par un parte matur.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Miller|2018|loc=Lead Section}} | {{harvnb|Costa|loc=Lead Section, § 1. Theories of Persistence}} | {{harvnb|Simons|2013|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=ql27m77IveQC&pg=PA166 166]}} | {{harvnb|Hawley|2023|loc=3. Change and Temporal Parts}} }}</ref>

=== Causalia ===

Causalia es la relata entre causa e efeto en cual un cosa produi o afeta un otra cosa.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Carroll|Markosian|2010|pp=20–22}} | {{harvnb|Tallant|2017|pp=218–219}} }}</ref> Per esemplo, si un person colpa un vitro e versa sua contenidas alora la colpa es la causa e la versa es la efeto.<ref>{{harvnb|Carroll|Markosian|2010|p=20}}</ref> Estra la causalia de un sola caso entre spesifadas en esta esemplo, on ave ance causalia de la caso jeneral espresada en declaras jeneral como "fuma causa canser".<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Carroll|Markosian|2010|pp=21–22}} | {{harvnb|Williamson|2012|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=yWWEIvNgUQ4C&pg=PA186 186]}} }}</ref> La terma causalia de ajente es usada si persones e sua atas causa alga cosa.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Ney|2014|pp=219, 252–253}} | {{harvnb|Tallant|2017|pp=233–234}} }}</ref> Causalia es tipal interpreteda deterministe, sinifiante ce un causa sempre produi sua efeto. Esta vista es rejetada par [[causalia probablial|teorias probablial]], cual afirma ce la causa mera aumenta la probablia ce la efeto aveni. Esta vista pote es usada per esplica ce fuma causa canser an si esta no es vera en cada caso.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Ney|2014|pp=228–231}} | {{harvnb|Williamson|2012|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=yWWEIvNgUQ4C&pg=PA185 185–186]}} }}</ref>

La teoria de normalia de causalia, inspirada par la filosofia de [[David Hume]], afirma ce causa es no plu ca un [[junta constante]] en cual la mente comprende ce un fenomeno, como pone sua mano en un foco, es sempre segueda par un otra fenomeno, como un senti de dole.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Lorkowski|loc=Lead Section, § 2. Necessary Connections and Hume’s Two Definitions, § 4. Causal Reductionism}} | {{harvnb|Carroll|Markosian|2010|pp=24–25}} | {{harvnb|Tallant|2017|pp=220–221}} }}</ref> Seguente teorias de normalia regulada, la normalia adota la formas de [[lege siensal|leges de natur]] studiada par siensa.<ref>{{harvnb|Ney|2014|pp=223–224}}</ref> Teorias contrafatal foca no a normalias ma a como efetos depende de sua causas. Los afirma ce efetos debe sua esiste a la causa e no ta es presente sin los.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Carroll|Markosian|2010|p=26}} | {{harvnb|Tallant|2017|pp=221–222}} | {{harvnb|Ney|2014|pp=224–225}} }}</ref> Seguente primitivisme, causa es un conseta fundal cual no pote es analiseda en termas de consetas noncausal, como regulas o relatas de depende. Un forma de primitivisme identifia potias causal inerente en cosas como la macina fundal.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Ney|2014|pp=231–232}} | {{harvnb|Mumford|2009|pp=94–95}} | {{harvnb|Mumford|Anjum|2013}} | {{harvnb|Koons|Pickavance|2015|pp=63–64}} }}</ref> Eliminatistes rejeta la teorias a supra par afirma ce on ave no causalia.<ref>{{harvnb|Tallant|2017|pp=231–232}}</ref>

=== La mente e volunta libre ===

La mente inclui fenomenos como [[pensa]], [[persepi]], [[senti]], e [[desira]] e ance la capasias fundal cual causa esta fenomenos.<ref>{{harvnb|Morton|2005|p=[https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/acref/9780199264797.001.0001/acref-9780199264797-e-1608?rskey=jqUtkA&result=1601 603]}}</ref> La [[problem de mente-corpo]] es la difisilia de clari la relata entre fenomenos fisical e mental. Seguente [[dualisme cartesian]], mentes e corpos es sustantias diferente. Los interata causal con lunlotra en modos variosa ma pote, a la min en prinsipe, esiste solitar.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|McLaughlin|1999|pp=684–685}} | {{harvnb|Kim|2005|p=608}} }}</ref> Esta vista es rejetada par [[monisme|monistes]], ci argumenta ce realia es composada de un sola tipo. Seguente [[idealisme]], tota es mental, incluinte ojetos fisical, cual pote es comprendeda como ideas o persepis de mentes consensa. Materialistes, en contrasta, afirma ce tota realia es material. Alga nega ce mente esiste ma la prosimi plu comun es esplica mente en termas de alga aspetas de materia, como states de serebro, [[disposa]]s condual, o roles funsional.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|McLaughlin|1999|pp=685–691}} | {{harvnb|Kim|2005|p=608}} | {{harvnb|Ramsey|2022|loc=Lead Section}} }}</ref> [[Monisme neutra|Monistes neutra]] argumenta ce realia es fundal no material e no mental e sujesta ce materia e mente es ambos fenomenos derivada.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Stubenberg|Wishon|2023|loc=Lead Section; § 1.3 Mind and Matter Revisited}} | {{harvnb|Griffin|1998}} }}</ref> Un aspeta clavin de la problem de mente-corpo es la [[problem difisil de consensia]], cual conserna la demanda de como sistemes fisical como serebros pote produi consensia fenomenal.<ref>{{harvnb|Weisberg|loc=Lead Section, § 1. Stating the Problem}}</ref>

La state de volunta libre–la capasia de un person per eleje sua atas–es un aspeta sentral de la problem de mente-corpo.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Timpe|loc=Lead Section}} | {{harvnb|Olson|2001|loc=[https://www.encyclopedia.com/medicine/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/mind-body-problem Mind–Body Problem]}} | {{harvnb|Armstrong|2018|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=uf7EDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA94 94]}} }}</ref> Metafisicistes es interesada en la relata entre volunta libre e [[determinisme causal]], la vista ce tota en la universo, incluinte condui umana, es determinada par avenis presedente e leges de natur. Lo es controversa si determinisme causal es vera, e, si lo es, esce esta ta implica ce on ave no volunta libre. Seguente [[nonacordablisme]], volunta libre no pote esiste en un mundo deterministe car on ave no eleje o controla vera si tota es determinada.{{efn|Per esemplo, la [[argumenta de resulta]] par [[Peter van Inwagen]] dise ce persones ave no potia sur la futur si tota es determinada par la pasada con la leges de natur.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Vihvelin|2022|loc=§ 5. Choice and the Consequence Argument}} | {{harvnb|Züricher|2021|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=kLQ6EAAAQBAJ&pg=PA234 234]}} }}</ref>}} Deterministes dur dedui de esta oserva ce on ave no volunta libre ma [[libertarisme (metafisica)|libertaristes]] conclui ce determinisme nesesa es falsa. [[Acordablisme|Acordablistes]] adota un prosimi tre par argumenta ce determinisme e volunta libre no esclui lunlotra, per esemplo, car un person pote ancora ata en acorda con sua motiva e elejes an si los es determinada par otra fortes. Volunta libre jua un rol clavin en etica en relata con la [[respondosia moral]] cual persones ave per lo cual los fa.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|O’Connor|Franklin|2022|loc=Lead Section, § 2. The Nature of Free Will}} | {{harvnb|Timpe|loc=Lead Section, § 1. Free Will, Free Action and Moral Responsibility, § 3. Free Will and Determinism}} | {{harvnb|Armstrong|2018|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=uf7EDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA94 94]}} }}</ref>

=== Otras ===

[[Identia (filosofia)|Identia]] es un relata cual cada cosa ave a se mesma como un forma de identicia. Lo refere a identia numeral cuando la mesma cosa es envolveda, como en la declara "la stela de matina es la stela de sera" (ambos es la planeta [[Venus]]). En un sinifia pico diferente, lo inclui identia cualial, ance nomida ''similia esata'' e ''nondistinguablia'', cual es la caso cuando du cosas diferente es esata simil, como jemelos identica perfeta.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Kirwan|2005|pp=417–418}} | {{harvnb|Noonan|Curtis|2022|loc=Lead Section}} }}</ref> La prinsipe de la nondistinguablia de identicas es vasta asetada e afirma ce cosas numeral identica sembla esata lunlotra. La prinsipe oposante, conoseda como la [[identia de nondistinguibles]] o la Lege de Leibniz, es plu controversa e afirma ce du cosas es numeral identica si los sembla esata lunlotra.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Sleigh|2005|p=418}} | {{harvnb|Kirwan|2005|pp=417–418}} | {{harvnb|Noonan|Curtis|2022|loc=§ 2. The Logic of Identity}} }}</ref> Un otra distingui es entre identia sincrona e diacrona. Identia sincrona relata un cosas con se mesma a la mesma tempo ma identia diacrona es sur la mesma cosa a tempos diferente, como en declaras como "la table cual me ia compra a la anio pasada es la mesma como la table en mea sala de come aora".<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Gallois|2016|loc=§ 2.1 Diachronic and Synchronic Identity}} | {{harvnb|Noonan|Curtis|2022|loc=Lead Section, § 5. Identity Over Time}} }}</ref> [[Identia personal]] es un tema relatada en metafisica cual usa la terma ''identia'' con un sinifia pico diferente e conserna demandas como cual fa ce algun es un person.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Noonan|Curtis|2022|loc=Lead Section}} | {{harvnb|Olson|2023|loc=Lead Section, § 1. The Problems of Personal Identity}} | {{harvnb|Korfmacher}} }}</ref>

Metafisicistes contempora variosa depende de la consetas de [[veria]], [[portaveria]], e [[causaveria]] per fa sua investigas.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Tallant|2017|pp=1–4}} | {{harvnb|Koons|Pickavance|2015|pp=15–17}} }}</ref> Veria es un cualia de es en acorda con realia. Portaverias es cosas cual pote es vera o falsa, como declaras lingual e representas mental. Un causaveria de un declara es la cosa de cual sua esiste fa ce la declara es vera.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Lowe|2005a|p=926}} | {{harvnb|Imaguire|2018|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=X4dnDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA34 34]}} | {{harvnb|Tallant|2017|pp=1–4}} | {{harvnb|Koons|Pickavance|2015|pp=15–17}} | {{harvnb|Asay|2020|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=nRXeDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA11 11]}} | {{harvnb|MacBride|2022}} }}</ref>  Per esemplo, la declara "un tomate es roja" es vera car on ave un tomate roja como sua causaveria.<ref>{{harvnb|Tallant|2017|p=1}}</ref> Fundida sur esta oserva, lo es posible per persegue rexerca metafisical par demanda cual la causaverias de declaras es, con campos diferente de metafisica esente dedicada a tipos diferente de declaras. Seguente esta vista, metafisica modal demanda cual fa ce declaras sur lo cual es posible e nesesada es vera e la metafisica de tempo es interesada en la causaverias de declaras tempal sur la pasada, la presente, e la futur.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Tallant|2017|pp=1–4, 163–165}} | {{harvnb|Koons|Pickavance|2015|pp=15–17, 154}} }}</ref>

== Metodolojia ==

Metafisicistes usa un varia de metodos per ariva a teorias metafisical e formula argumentas per e contra los.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Loux|Crisp|2017|pp=xi, 2}} | {{harvnb|Koons|Pickavance|2015|pp=2–3}} }}</ref> Tradisional, metodos ''a priori'' es la prosimi dominante. Los depende de intui razonal e razona astrata de prinsipes jeneral en loca de [[esperia]] sensal. Prosimis ''a posteriori'', en contrasta, fundi teorias metafisical en oservas empirical e teorias siensal.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Koons|Pickavance|2015|pp=2–3}} | {{harvnb|Mumford|2012|loc=§ 10. What Is Metaphysics?}} | {{harvnb|Tahko|2015|pp=151–152}} | {{harvnb|Jaksland|2023|pp=198–199}} }}</ref> Alga metafisicistes usa perspetivas de campos como [[fisica]], [[psicolojia]], [[linguistica]] e istoria per fa sua investiga.<ref>{{harvnb|Koons|Pickavance|2015|pp=2–3}}</ref> La du prosimis no es escluinte e lo es posible per combina elementos de ambos.<ref>{{harvnb|Tahko|2015|pp=151–152, 172–173}}</ref> La metodo cual un metafisiciste usa depende frecuente de sua conseta de la natur de metafisica, per esemplo, esce los vide lo como un investiga de la strutur de realia nondependente de la mente, como realistes metafisical afirma, o la prinsipes cual suporta pensa e esperia, como alga antirealistes metafisical afirma.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Mumford|2012|loc=§ 10. What Is Metaphysics?}} | {{harvnb|Koons|Pickavance|2015|pp=2–3}} | {{harvnb|Effingham|Beebee|Goff|2010|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=BBKsAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA123 123]}} | {{harvnb|Khlentzos|2021|loc=Lead Section, § 3. The Anti-Realist Challenges to Metaphysical Realism}} }}</ref>

Prosimis ''a priori'' depende frecuente de intuis, pd, impresas nondeduinte sur la coretia de afirmas spesifada o prinsipes jeneral.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Daly|2015|pp=[https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9781137344557_1 11–12]|loc=Introduction and Historical Overview}} | {{harvnb|Duignan|2009a}} | {{harvnb|Tahko|2015|pp=177–180}}}}</ref>{{efn|La terma ''intui'' ave un varia de otra sinifias en filosofia. Lo pote refere a un opina simple, un disposa per crede, lo cual pare es la caso, o un relata entre la mente e ojetos astrata.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Pust|2019|loc=§ 1. The Nature of Intuitions}} | {{harvnb|Lacey|2005|p=[https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/acref/9780199264797.001.0001/acref-9780199264797-e-1255 442]}} }}</ref> La conseta jua un rol sentral en la filosofia de [[Immanuel Kant]], ci comprende intuis como representas consensa e ojetiva prosima asosiada con la sensa de spasio e tempo.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Janiak|2022|loc=§ 2.2 Kant's Understanding of Representation}} | {{harvnb|Lacey|2005|p=[https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/acref/9780199264797.001.0001/acref-9780199264797-e-1255 442]}} }}</ref>}} Per esemplo, argumentas per la teoria A de tempo, cual afirma ce tempo flue de la pasada tra la presente e a en la futur, depende frecuente de intuis preteorial asosiada con la sensa de la pasa de tempo.<ref>{{harvnb|Tahko|2015|pp=188–190}}</ref> Alga prosimis usa intuis per crea un colie peti de prinsipes fundal e [[autoevidentia|autoevidente]], conoseda como [[axiom]]es, e usa [[razona deduinte]] per construi sistemes metafisical complicada par fa concluis de esta axiomes.<ref>{{harvnb|Goldenbaum|loc=Lead Section, § 1. The Geometrical Method}}</ref> Prosimis fundida sur intui pote es combinada con [[esperimenta de pensa|esperimentas de pensa]], cual aida evoca e clari intuis par lia los a situas imajinada en cuando on usa [[pensa contrafatal]] per evalua la resultas posible de esta situas.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Tahko|2015|pp=177–178}} | {{harvnb|Brown|Fehige|2019|loc=Lead Section}} | {{harvnb|Goffi|Roux|2011|pp=[https://philpapers.org/rec/GOFOTV 165, 168–169]}} | {{harvnb|Eder|Lawler|van Riel|2020|pp=915–916}} }}</ref> Per esplora la relata entre materia e consensia, alga teoristes compara umanas a [[zombi filosofial|zombis filosofial]], pd, viventes ipotesal identica a umanas ma sin [[consensia|esperia consensa]].<ref>{{harvnb|Kirk|2023|loc=Lead Section, § 2. Zombies and Physicalism}}</ref> Un metodo relatada depende de credes comun asetada en loca de intuis per formula argumentas e teorias. La prosimi de [[sensa comun]] es frecuente usada per critica teorias metafisical cual devia multe de como la person promedia pensa sur un tema. Per esemplo, filosofistes de sensa comun ia argumenta ce [[nihilisme merolojial]] es falsa car lo implica ce cosas comun asetada, como tables, no esiste.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Lawson|2020|pp=185–186}} | {{harvnb|Jaksland|2023|pp=198–199}} }}</ref>

[[Analise filosofial|Analise consetal]], un metodo spesial importante en [[filosofia analisal]], atenta desconstrui consetas metafisical a partes composante per clari sua sinifia e identifia relatas esensal.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Jackson|1998|pp=28–30}} | {{harvnb|Eder|Lawler|van Riel|2020|p=915}} | {{harvnb|Shaffer|2015|pp=[https://www.jstor.org/stable/26602327 555–556]}} | {{harvnb|Audi|2006|loc=[https://www.encyclopedia.com/philosophy-and-religion/philosophy/philosophy-terms-and-concepts/philosophy § Philosophical Methods]}} }}</ref> En [[fenomenolojia]], la metodo de [[redui eidetica|varia eidetica]] es usada per investiga strutures esensal cual suporta [[fenomeno]]s. Per studia la cualias esensal de cualce tipo de ojeto, lo prosede par imajina esta ojeto e varia sua cualias per identifia los cual es esensal e no pote es cambiada.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Drummond|2022|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=VQ9hEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA75 75]}} | {{harvnb|Ryckman|2005|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=FI1JCAAAQBAJ&pg=PA142 142–144]}} }}</ref> La metodo [[argumenta transendente|transendente]] es un otra prosimi e esamina la strutur metafisical de realia par oserva cual cosas esiste e studia la [[Nesesada de posiblia|nesesadas de posiblia]] sin cual esta cosas no ta pote esiste.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Coelho|2001|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=P518M0X_zakC&pg=PA128 128]}} | {{harvnb|Körner|1984|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=eAA4AAAAIAAJ&pg=PA183 183–184]}} | {{harvnb|Pihlström|2009|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=srGLpb7pWdkC&pg=PA60 60–61]}} | {{harvnb|Stern|Cheng|2023|loc=Lead Section}} }}</ref>

Alga prosimis dona min importa a razona ''a priori'' e vide metafisica como un pratica continuante con la siensas empirical cual jenerali sua intuis en cuando los fa ce sua suposas fundal deveni nonambigua. Esta prosimi es conoseda como ''metafisica naturalida'' e es prosima asosiada con la obra de [[Willard Van Orman Quine]].<ref>{{multiref|{{harvnb|Ney|2014|pp=30–31}}|{{harvnb|van Inwagen|Sullivan|Bernstein|2023|loc=§ 4. The Methodology of Metaphysics}}|{{harvnb|Jaksland|2023|pp=198–199}}}}</ref> El depende de la idea ce frases vera de la siensas e otra campos ave [[obligas ontolojial]], pd, los implica ce alga cosas esiste.<ref>{{multiref|{{harvnb|Ney|2014|pp=37–38, 40}}|{{harvnb|van Inwagen|Sullivan|Bernstein|2023|loc=§ 4. The Methodology of Metaphysics}}}}</ref> Per esemplo, si la frase "alga eletrones es liada a protones" es vera alora lo pote es usada per justi ce eletrones e protones esiste.<ref>{{harvnb|Ney|2014|p=41}}</ref> Quine ia usa esta intui per argumenta ce on pote aprende sur metafisica par atendente analise{{efn|La metodo de analise de Quine depende de [[tradui lojical]] a [[lojica de ordina prima]] per espresa afirmas tan esata como posible e depende de [[cuantador esistal|cuantadores esistal]] per identifia sua obligas ontolojial.<ref>{{harvnb|Ney|2014|pp=40–41}}</ref>}} afirmas siensal per comprende cual tipo de imaje metafisical de la mundo los presuposa.<ref>{{multiref|{{harvnb|Ney|2014|pp=40–43}}|{{harvnb|van Inwagen|Sullivan|Bernstein|2023|loc=§ 4. The Methodology of Metaphysics}}}}</ref>

En ajunta a metodos de investiga metafisical, on ave alga prinsipes metodolojial usada per deside entre teorias competente par compara sua virtuas teorial. La [[Rasador de Ockham]] es un prinsipe bon conoseda cual dona prefere a teorias simple, spesial, a teorias cual suposa ce poca cosas esiste. Otra prinsipes considera la [[potia esplicante]], la usosia teorial, e la prosimia a credes fundida.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|McDaniel|2020|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=3tDaDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA217 217–221]}} | {{harvnb|Ney|2014|pp=48–49}} | {{harvnb|Mumford|2012|loc=§ 10. What Is Metaphysics?}} | {{harvnb|van Inwagen|Sullivan|Bernstein|2023|loc=§ 4. The Methodology of Metaphysics}} | {{harvnb|Koons|Pickavance|2015|pp=2–3}} }}</ref>

== Critica ==

[[File:Allan Ramsay - David Hume, 1711 - 1776. Historian and philosopher - Google Art Project.jpg|thumb|alt=Painting of David Hume|[[David Hume]] ia critica metafisicistes per atenta ariva a sabe sur cosas estra la campo de esperia sensal.]]

An si sua state como un de la ramos xef de filosofia, metafisica ia reseta criticas diversa cual pone en duta sua state como un campo valida de investiga.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|van Inwagen|Sullivan|Bernstein|2023|loc=§ 5. Is Metaphysics Possible?}} | {{harvnb|Manley|2009|pp=1–2}} }}</ref> Un tipo de critica afirma ce investiga metafisical es nonposible car umanas no ave la capasias cognisial nesesada per asede la natur ultima de realia.<ref>{{harvnb|van Inwagen|Sullivan|Bernstein|2023|loc=§ 5. Is Metaphysics Possible?}}</ref> Esta linia de pensa gida a un forma de [[seticisme]] sur la posible de sabe metafisical. Lo es frecuente segueda par empiricalistes como Hume, ci argumenta ce on ave no [[sabe|fonte bon de sabe metafisical]] car metafisica es estra la campo de [[demostra empirical|sabe empirical]] e depende de intuis dutable sur la rena ultra esperia sensal. Un conserna prosima relatada sur la nonfidablia de teorias metafisical es ce on ave desacordas profonda e durante sur temas metafisical, indicante un manca de progresa jeneral.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Rea|2021|pp=211–212}} | {{harvnb|Carroll|Markosian|2010|pp=16–17}} | {{harvnb|Koons|Pickavance|2015|pp=4–5}} }}</ref>

Un otra critica afirma ce la problem no es con la capasias cognisial umana ma con la declaras metafisical mesma, cual es afirmada como no vera e no falsa ma sin [[sinifia (filosofia)|sinifia]]. Seguente [[positivisme lojical|positivistes lojical]], per esemplo, la sinifia de un declara es donada par la prosede usada per serti lo, tipal en termas de la [[oserva]]s cual ta confirma lo. Fundida sur esta suposa controversa, los argumenta ce declaras metafisical es sin sinifia car los no fa predises sur esperia.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|van Inwagen|Sullivan|Bernstein|2023|loc=§ 5. Is Metaphysics Possible?}} | {{harvnb|Manley|2009|p=4}} | {{harvnb|Rea|2021|pp=212–215}} | {{harvnb|Koons|Pickavance|2015|p=5}} }}</ref>

Un vista pico plu debil permete ce declaras metafisical ave sinifia ma afirma ce desacordas metafisical es mera disputas verbal sur modos diferente de descrive la mundo. Seguente esta vista, la desacorda en la metafisica de composa sur esce on ave tables o sola particulas ordinada en modo de table es un debate trivial sur preferes lingual sin cualce resultas sustantial per la natur de realia.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Manley|2009|pp=1–4}} | {{harvnb|Rea|2021|pp=213–215}} | {{harvnb|Tahko|2015|pp=71–72}} }}</ref> La vista ce disputas metafisical ave no sinifia o no punto sinifiante es nomida '''''deflaisme metafisical''''' o '''''ontolojial'''''.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Manley|2009|pp=4, 15, 32}} | {{harvnb|Sider|2009|pp=386–387}} }}</ref> Esta vista es oposada par metafisicistes seria, ci argumenta ce disputas metafisical es sur cualias sustantial de la strutur fundal de realia.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Manley|2009|pp=28, 36}} | {{harvnb|Kriegel|2016|pp=272–273}} }}</ref> Un debate prosima relatada entre [[realisme filosofial|realistes]] ontolojial e antirealistes conserna la demanda de esce on ave cualce fatos ojetal cual determina cual teorias metafisical es vera.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Chalmers|2009|pp=77–78}} | {{harvnb|Loux|Crisp|2017|pp=304–305}} | {{harvnb|Tahko|2015|pp=65–66, 68}} }}</ref> Un critica diferente, formulada par [[practicalisme|praticalistes]], vide la fali de metafisica no en sua aspiras cognisial o la nonsinifia de sua declaras, ma en sua nonpertine pratical e manca de usosia.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Koons|Pickavance|2015|p=5}} | {{harvnb|Macarthur|2020|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=ra7QDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA166 166]}} }}</ref>

[[Martin Heidegger]] ia critica metafisica tradisional, disente ce lo fali distingui entre cosas individua e es como sua funda ontolojial. Sua atenta revela la suposas e limitas fundal en la istoria de metafisica per "vinse metafisica" ia influe la metodo de [[desconstrui]] de [[Jacques Derrida]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Wheeler|2020|loc=§ 1. Biographical Sketch, § 2.2.1 The Question, § 3.3 Technology}} | {{harvnb|Gilje|Skirbekk|2017|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=_I00e3SQAwMC&pg=PA463 463–464]}} | {{harvnb|Holland|1999|loc=Lead Section}} | {{harvnb|Beaulieu|Kazarian|Sushytska|2014|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=d4PzBQAAQBAJ&pg=PA3 3–4]}} }}</ref> Derrida ia usa esta prosimi per critica testos metafisical per depende de termas oposante, como presentia e asentia, cual el ia pensa ia es inerente nonstable e contradisente.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Reynolds|loc=Lead Section, § 2. Deconstructive Strategy}} | {{harvnb|Gilje|Skirbekk|2017|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=_I00e3SQAwMC&pg=PA463 463–464]}} | {{harvnb|Holland|1999|loc=Lead Section}} }}</ref>

Lo es dutable esce la criticas de metafisica afeta la disiplina como un intera o sola alga temas o prosimis en lo. Per esemplo, lo ta es la caso ce alga disputas metafisical es mera verbal ma otras es sustantial.<ref>{{harvnb|Rea|2021|pp=215–216, 223–224}}</ref>

== Relata con otra campos ==

Metafisica relata con multe campos de investiga par esamina sua consetas fundal e sua relata con la strutur fundal de realia. Per esemplo, siensistes depende frecuente de consetas como [[lege siensal|lege de natur]], causalia, nesesadia, e spasiotempo per formula sua teorias e predise o esplica la resultas de esperimentas.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Göhner|Schrenk|loc=Lead Section, § 1. What Is Metaphysics of Science?}} | {{harvnb|Mumford|Tugby|2013|pp=1–2}} | {{harvnb|Hawley|2018|pp=187–188}} }}</ref> An si la foca xef de siensistes es la aplica de esta consetas a situas spesifada, metafisica esamina sua natur jeneral e como los depende de lunlotra. Fisicistes formula leges spesifada de natur, como [[lege de Newton de gravita universal|leges de gravita]] e [[leges de termodinamica|termodinamica]], per descrive como sistemes fisical condui en ambientes variosa. Metafisicistes, en contrasta, demanda cual tota leges de natur ave en comun, per esemplo, esce los descrive mera normalias dependente o espresa relatas nesesada.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Göhner|Schrenk|loc=§ 3. Why Do We Need Metaphysics of Science?, § 4c. Laws of Nature}} | {{harvnb|Roberts|2016|pp=337–338}} }}</ref> A la mesma tempo, trovas siensal nova ia influe ance teorias metafisical esistente e ia inspira novas. La [[teoria de relativia]] de Einstein, per esemplo, ia stimula alga metafisicistes a conseta spasio e tempo como un dimension unida en loca de como dimensiones nondependente.<ref>{{harvnb|Healey|2016|pp=356–357}}</ref> Metafisicistes con foca empirical depende frecuente de teorias siensal per fundi sua teorias sur la natur de realia en oservas empirical.<ref>{{harvnb|Hawley|2018|pp=187–188}}</ref>

Temas simil pertine a la [[siensas sosial]] do metafisicistes investiga sua consetas fundal e analise sua implicas metafisical. Esta inclui demandas como esce fatos sosial veni de fatos nonsosial, esce grupos e instituidas sosial ave esiste nondependente de la mente, e como los persiste tra tempo.<ref>{{harvnb|Hawley|2018|pp=188–189}}</ref> Suposas e temas metafisical en [[psicolojia]] e [[psiciatria]] inclui la demandas sur la relata entre corpo e mente, esce la natur de la mente umana es istorial fisada, e cual es la state metafisical de maladias.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Dafermos|2021|pp=1–2, 6–7}} | {{harvnb|Hawley|2016|p=174}} }}</ref>

Metafisica es simil a ambos [[cosmolojia fisical]] e [[teolojia]] en sua interesa en la causas prima e la universo como un intera. Diferes clavin es ce metafisica depende de investiga razonal ma cosmolojia fisical dona plu pesa a oservas empirical e teolojia es fundida sur [[revela]] divin e dotrinas fundida sur crede.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Van Inwagen|2024|pp=6–8}} | {{harvnb|Loux|Crisp|2017|p=10}} }}</ref> Istorial, cosmolojia e teolojia ia es regardada como sucampos de metafisica.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Dryer|2016|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=S8weDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA490 490]}} | {{harvnb|Loux|Crisp|2017|p=10}} }}</ref>

{{cladogram
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}}

Metafisica en la forma de ontolojia jua un rol sentral en [[informatica]] per clasi ojetos e representa formal informa sur los. No como metafisicistes, informaticistes no es tipal interesada en furni un sola descrive incluinte de tota realia como un intera ma en loca los usa multe ontolojias diferente, cada consernada sola con un campo limitada de cosas.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Goy|Magro|2014|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=MJd_BAAAQBAJ&pg=PA7456 7456–7457]}} | {{harvnb|Hawley|2016|pp=168–170}} }}</ref> Per esemplo, un [[banco de datos]] de un universia ta usa un ontolojia con categorias como ''person'', ''ensenior'', ''studiante'', e ''esamina'' per representa informa sur ativias academial.<ref>{{harvnb|Goy|Magro|2014|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=MJd_BAAAQBAJ&pg=PA7457 7457]}}</ref> Ontolojias furni normas o consetas per codigi e reteni informa en un modo struturida, cual capasi usa e cambia la informa par prosedes computante.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Goy|Magro|2014|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=MJd_BAAAQBAJ&pg=PA7456 7456–7457]}} | {{harvnb|Hawley|2016|pp=168–169}} }}</ref> Alga bancos de sabe integra informa cual parteni a campos variosa, cual introdui la difisilia de maneja datos cual ia es formida usante ontolojias diferente. On vinse lo par furni un [[ontolojia superior]] cual defini consetas a un nivel plu alta de astratia per aplica a tota campos. Ontolojias superior influente inclui la ''Suggested Upper Merged Ontology'' (Ontolojia Superior Fusada Sujestada) e la ''Basic Formal Ontology'' (Ontolojia Formal Fundal).<ref>{{harvnb|Gopalakrishnan Nair|2014|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=MJd_BAAAQBAJ&pg=PA4594 4594]}}</ref>

[[Lojica]] – la studia de razona coreta<ref>{{multiref|{{harvnb|MacFarlane|2017}}|{{harvnb|Corkum|2015|pp=753–767}}|{{harvnb|Blair|Johnson|2000|pp=93–95}}|{{harvnb|Magnus|2005|loc=1.6 Formal Languages|pp=12–14}}}}</ref> – es frecuente usada par metafisicistes como un util per fa sua investigas e espresa intuis usante formulas lojical esata.<ref>{{harvnb|Ney|2014|pp=1–2, 18–20}}</ref> Un otra relata entre la du campos conserna la suposas metafisical asosiada con [[Sistem formal|sistemes lojical]]. Multe sistemes lojical como [[lojica de ordina prima]] depende de [[Cuantador esistal|cuantadores esistal]] per espresa declaras esistal. Per esemplo, en la formula lojical <math display="inline">\exists{x{\text{Cavalo}}(x)}</math> la cuantador esistal <chem display="inline">\exists</chem> es aplicada a la predica <math>\text{Cavalo}</math> per espresa ce on ave cavalos. Seguente Quine, metafisicistes variosa suposa ce cuantadores esistal porta [[obligas ontolojial]], sinifiante ce declaras esistal implica ce la cosa supra cual on cuanti formi un parte de realia.<ref>{{multiref|{{harvnb|Shapiro|Kouri Kissel|2022|loc=§2.1 Building Blocks}}|{{harvnb|Cook|2009|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=JfaqBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA111 111]}}|{{harvnb|Kind|2018|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=oDhjDwAAQBAJ&pg=PT236 236]}}|{{harvnb|Casati|Fujikawa|loc=Lead Section, §1. Existence as a Second-Order Property and Its Relation to Quantification}}}}</ref>

== Istoria ==
[[File:Yin yang.svg|thumb|right|upright=0.8|alt=Symbol de yin e yang|La simbol de [[taijitu]] mostra [[yin-yang|yin e yang]], cual es du fortes corelatada discuteda en metafisica xines per esplora la natur e motifes de esiste. <ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Perkins|2023|loc=Lead Section}} | {{harvnb|Littlejohn|loc=§ 5. Fundamental Concepts in the Daodejing}} }}</ref>]]
La istoria de metafisica esamina como la investiga de la strutur fundal de realia ia evolui en la curso de istoria. Metafisica ave sua orijina en divinas sur la natur e orijina de la cosmo cual ia comensa en la eda antica.<ref>{{multiref|{{harvnb|Hancock|2006|p=183}}|{{harvnb|Hamlyn|2005|p=590}}}}</ref> En Barat antica, comensante en la sentenio 7 aec, la [[Upanixades]] ia es scriveda como testos relijiosa e filosofial cual esamina como realia ultima es la funda de tota es. Los esplora plu la natur de la se e como lo pote ateni libria par comprende realia ultima.<ref>{{multiref|{{harvnb|Perrett|2016|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=q7wwCwAAQBAJ&pg=PA7 7–10]}}|{{harvnb|Grayling|2019|loc=§ Indian Philosophy}}|{{harvnb|Andrea|Overfield|2015|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=x5-aBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA70 70–71]}}}}</ref> Esta periodo ia vide ance la emerji de [[budisme]] en la sentenio 6 aec,{{efn|La data esta es disputada.<ref>{{harvnb|Velez|loc=§ 1a. Dates}}</ref>}} cual nega la esiste de un se nondependente e comprende la mundo como un prosede sicle.<ref>{{multiref|{{harvnb|Perrett|2016|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=q7wwCwAAQBAJ&pg=PA7 7–10]}}|{{harvnb|Velez|loc=Lead Section, § 3. The Buddha's Cosmology and Metaphysics}}|{{harvnb|Grayling|2019|loc=§ Indian Philosophy}}}}</ref> Sirca la mesma tempo{{efn|Seguente naras tradisional, [[Laozi]] como la fundor de dauisme ia vive en la sentenio 6 ace ma otra naras ia dise ce lo es posible ce el ia vive en la senentios 4 o 3 aec.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Dynes|2016|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=pxjOEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA60 60]}} | {{harvnb|Littlejohn|loc=§ 2. Classical Sources for Our Understanding of Daoism}} }}</ref>}} en [[Xina antica]], la scola de [[dauisme]] ia es fundida e ia esplora la ordina natural de la universo, conoseda como [[Dau]], e como lo es marcada par la interata de [[Yin-yang|yin e yang]] como du fortes corelatada.<ref>{{multiref|{{harvnb|Littlejohn|loc=§ 5. Fundamental Concepts in the Daodejing}}|{{harvnb|Dynes|2016|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=pxjOEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA60 60–61]}}}}</ref>

En [[Elas antica]], metafisica emerji en la sentenio 6 aec con la filosofistes presocratiste, ci dona esplicas razonal de la cosmo intera par esamina la [[Prinsipe prima|prinsipes prima]] de cual tota veni. Seguente los, [[Platon]] (427-347 aec) ia formula sua [[teoria de formas]], cual afirma ce formas o ideas eterna posese la tipo la plu alta de realia e la mundo material es sola un refleta nonperfeta de los.<ref>{{multiref|{{harvnb|Hancock|2006|pp=184–185}}|{{harvnb|Hamlyn|2005|p=590}}|{{harvnb|Graham|loc=§ 3b. Metaphysics}}}}</ref> [[Aristotele]] (384-322 aec) ia aseta la idea de Platon ce on ave formas universal ma ia crede ce los no pote esiste solitar e depende de materia. El ia proposa ance un sistem de categorias e ia developa un strutur completa de la mundo natural con sua teoria de la [[cuatro causas]].<ref>{{multiref|{{harvnb|Hancock|2006|pp=185–187}}|{{harvnb|Hamlyn|2005|p=590}}|{{harvnb|Graham|loc=§ 4a. Terminology, § 4f. Metaphysics}}}}</ref> Comensante en la sentenio 4 aec, [[filosofia eliniste]] ia esplora la ordina razonal cual suporta la cosmo e la idea ce lo es composada de [[Atomisme|atomes nondividable]].<ref>{{multiref|{{harvnb|Hamlyn|2005|p=590}}|{{harvnb|Graham|loc=§ 5a. Epicureanism, § 5c. The Stoics}}}}</ref> [[Neoplatonisme]] ia emerji a la fini de la periodo antica en la sentenio 3 ec e ia introdui la idea de "la Un" como un cosa transendente e nonespresable cual es la fonte de tota crea.<ref>{{multiref|{{harvnb|Hancock|2006|pp=187–188}}|{{harvnb|Hamlyn|2005|pp=590–591}}|{{harvnb|Graham|loc=§ 5. Post-Hellenistic Thought}}}}</ref>

Entretempo, en [[budisme barati]], la [[Madhyamaka|scola Madhyamaka]] ia developa la idea ce tota fenomenos es [[Sunyata|inerente vacua]] sin un esense permanente e la dotrina de sola consensia de la [[Yogācāra|scola Yogācāra]] ia afirma ce ojetos esperiada es mera cambias de consensia cual no refleta realia eterna.<ref>{{multiref|{{harvnb|Grayling|2019|loc=§ Indian Philosophy}}|{{harvnb|Depraz|Varela|Vermersch|2003|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=iYJy_2909NAC&pg=PA212 212]}}|{{harvnb|Shun'ei|2014|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=1C4qAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA5 5–6]}}}}</ref> La scola indu de filosofia [[Samkhya]]{{efn|La ideas cual suporta la filosofia Samkhya ia emerji tan temprana como la sentenios 7 e 6 aec ma sua formula clasica e sistemosa es datida a 350 ec. <ref name="auto1">{{multiref | {{harvnb|Ruzsa|loc=Lead Section}} | {{harvnb|Grayling|2019|loc=§ Indian Philosophy}} }}</ref>}} ia introdui un dualisme metafisical con [[Purusha|consensia pur]] e [[Prakṛti|materia]] como sua categorias fundal.<ref name="auto1" /> En Xina, la scola de [[Xuanxue]] ia esplora problemes metafisical como la contrasta entre es e no es.<ref>{{multiref|{{harvnb|Chai|2020|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=LSAAEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA19 19]}}|{{harvnb|Robinet|2013|loc=[https://books.google.com/books?id=R3Sp6TfzhpIC&pg=PA274 Chongxuan]}}}}</ref>

[[File:Boethius.jpeg|thumb|alt=Desinia de Boethius|La teoria de universales de [[Boethius]] ia influe multe metaficistes ci ia veni a pos.]]

Filosofia ueste medieval ia es forte influeda par filosofia elinica antica. [[Boethius]] (477–524 ec) ia atenta armoni la teorias de universales de Platon e Aristotele par afirma ce universales pote esiste ambos en materia e mente. Sua teoria ia inspira la filosofias de nominalisme e consetalisme, como en la pensa de [[Peter Abelard]] (1079–1142 ec).<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hancock|2006|pp=188–189}} | {{harvnb|Grayling|2019|loc=§ Boethius, § Abelard}} | {{harvnb|Marenbon|2009|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=DYSVbvnDL8IC&pg=PA6 6]}} | {{harvnb|Sweeney|2016|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=orIYDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA10 10–11]}} }}</ref> [[Thomas Aquinas]] (1224–1274 ec) ia comprende metafisica como la disiplina cual investiga la sinifias diferente de ''es'', como la contrasta entre sustantia e cualias nonesensal, e prinsipes cual aplica a tota cosas, como la [[lege de identia|prinsipe de identia]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Brown|loc=§ 5. Metaphysics}} | {{harvnb|Hancock|2006|p=189}} }}</ref> [[William de Ockham]] (1285–1347 ec) ia proposa la prinsipes metodolojial de la Rasador de Ockham como un util per deside entre teorias metafisical competente.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hancock|2006|p=190}} | {{harvnb|Grayling|2019|loc=§ Ockham}} }}</ref> Filosofia arabi-persian, cual ia ave sua apico de la temprana de la sentenio 9 ec a la tarda de la sentenio 12 ec, ia usa multe ideas de la filosofistes elinica antica per interprete e clari la ensenias de la [[Curan]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Grayling|2019|loc=Arabic–Persian Philosophy}} | {{harvnb|Adamson|Taylor|2004|pp=1–3}} }}</ref> [[Avicenna]] (980–1037 ec) ia developa un sistem filosofial completa cual ia esamina la contrasta entre esiste e esense e ia distingui entre esiste dependente e nesesada.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Grayling|2019|loc=§ Ibn Sina (Avicenna)}} | {{harvnb|Lizzini|2021|loc=Lead Section, § 3. Essence and Existence, § 4. Modality and Existence}} }}</ref> [[Barat medieval]] ia vide la emerji de la scola [[monisme|moniste]] de [[Advaita Vedanta]] en la sentenio 8 ec, cual afirma ce tota es un e ce la idea de multe cosas esiste nondependente es un ilude.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Grayling|2019|loc=§ Indian Philosophy}} | {{harvnb|Perrett|2016|loc=§ The Medieval Period of Indian Philosophy}} | {{harvnb|Dalal|2021|loc=Lead Section, § 2.3 Two-Tiered Reality}} }}</ref> En Xina, [[neoconfuzisme]] ia emerji en la sentenio 9 ec e ia esplora la [[li (neoconfuzisme)|conseta de li]] como la prinsipe razonal cual es la funda de es e refleta la ordina de la universo.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Berthrong|loc=Lead Section, § 4. Traits, Themes and Motifs}} | {{harvnb|Wu|2022|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=zRVmEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA56 56]}} | {{harvnb|Smart|2008|p=99}}}}</ref>

En la periodo moderna temprana, [[René Descartes]] (1596–1650) ia developa un dualisme de sustantia en cual corpo e mente esiste como cosas nondependente cual interata causal.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hamlyn|2005|p=591}} | {{harvnb|Dehsen|2013|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=cU7cAAAAQBAJ&pg=PA51 51]}} }}</ref> Esta idea ia es rejetada par [[Baruch Spinoza]] (1632–1677), ci ia formula un filosofia moniste en cual on ave sola un sustantia cual ave ambos cualias fisical e mental cual developa con lado a lado sin interata.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hancock|2006|p=190}} | {{harvnb|Hamlyn|2005|p=591}} }}</ref> [[Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz]] (1646–1716) ia introdui la conseta de mundos posible e ia crea un sistem metafisical, conoseda como [[monadolojia]], cual comprende la universo como un colie de sustantias simple cual es sincronida sin interata causal con lunlotra.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hancock|2006|pp=190–191}} | {{harvnb|Hamlyn|2005|p=591}} | {{harvnb|Look|2020|loc=§ 4. Metaphysics: A Primer on Substance}} | {{harvnb|Menzel|2023|loc=1. Possible Worlds and Modal Logic}} }}</ref> [[Christian Wolff]] (1679–1754), ia conseta la estende de metafisica par introdui la distingui entre metafisica jeneral e spesial.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Svare|2006|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=60MsUE3K2ekC&pg=PA15 15]}} | {{harvnb|Hettche|Dyck|2019|loc=§ 5. Metaphysics}} }}</ref> Seguente la [[idealisme]] de [[George Berkeley]] (1685–1753), tota es mental, incluinte ojetos material, cual es ideas persepida par la mente.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hancock|2006|p=192}} | {{harvnb|Hamlyn|2005|p=591}} }}</ref> [[David Hume]] (1711–1776) ia fa contribuis variosa a metafisica, incluinte la teoria de normalia de causalia e la idea ce on ave no lias nesesada entre cosas diferente. A la mesma tempo, sua perspetiva [[empiricalisme|empirical]] ia gida el a formula un critica sever de teorias metafisical cual atenta ariva a prinsipes ultima cual es nonasedable par esperia sensal.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Morris|Brown|2023|loc=§ 3. Philosophical Project, § 5. Causation, § 6. The Idea of Necessary Connection}} | {{harvnb|Hamlyn|2005|pp=591–592}} }}</ref> Esta perspetiva setica ia es asetada par [[Immanuel Kant]] (1724–1804). El ia atenta reconseta metafisica como un investiga de la prinsipes e categorias fundal de pensa e comprende en loca de vide lo como un atenta per comprende realia nondependente de la mente.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hancock|2006|pp=192–193}} | {{harvnb|Hamlyn|2005|p=592}} | {{harvnb|Wood|2009|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=i7PG-Vk824UC&pg=PA354 354]}} | {{harvnb|Loux|Crisp|2017|pp=1–2, 6}} }}</ref>

Multe developas en la periodo moderna tarda ia es formida par la filosofia de Kant. [[Idealisme deutx|Idealistes deutx]] ia usa sua perspetiva idealiste en sua atenta per trova un prinsipe uninte como la funda de tota realia.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hancock|2006|p=193}} | {{harvnb|Hamlyn|2005|p=592}} | {{harvnb|Critchley|2001|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=syhsLJ1eMOEC&pg=PA31 31]}} }}</ref> [[Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel]] (1770–1831) ia developa un sistem completa de filosofia cual esamina como spirito asoluta mostra se.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hamlyn|2005|p=592}} | {{harvnb|Green|2008|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=Gu6YVfL58OQC&pg=PA172 172]}} }}</ref> El ia inspira la [[idealisme brites]] de [[Francis Herbert Bradley]] (1846–1924), ci ia interprete spirito asoluta como la totalia cual inclui tota es.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hancock|2006|p=193}} | {{harvnb|Hamlyn|2005|p=592}} | {{harvnb|Grayling|2019|loc=§ Idealism}} }}</ref> [[Arthur Schopenhauer]] (1788–1860) ia es un critica forte de idealisme deutx e ia espresa un vista metafisical diferente cual prende un [[voluntaisme|volunta sieca e nonrazonal como la prinsipe fundal de realia]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Grayling|2019|loc=§ Schopenhauer}} | {{harvnb|Janaway|1999|pp=[https://academic.oup.com/book/2954/chapter-abstract/143638920?redirectedFrom=fulltext 248–249]}} }}</ref> Praticalistes  como [[C. S. Peirce]] (1839–1914) e [[John Dewey]] (1859–1952) ia conseta metafisica como un siensa oservante de la cualias la plu jeneral de realia e esperia.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hancock|2006|p=194}} | {{harvnb|Misak|2008|loc=[https://books.google.com/books?id=p30osmyc2xoC&pg=PA406 Scientific Realism, Anti-Realism, and Empiricism]}} }}</ref>

[[File:ANWhitehead.jpg|thumb|alt=Foto de Alfred North Whitehead|[[Alfred North Whitehead]] fundi la [[filosofia de prosedes]] en sua obra ''[[Prosede e Realia]]''.]]

A la cambia de la sentenio 20 en [[filosofia analisal]], filosofistes como [[Bertrand Russell]] (1872–1970) e [George Edward Moore]] (1873–1958) ia gida un "revolta contra idealisme". [[Atomisme lojical|Atomistes lojical]], como Russell e [[Ludwig Wittgenstein]] a la comensa de sua carera (1889–1951), ia conseta la mundo como un multia de fatos atomal, cual ia inspira metafisicistes plu tarda como [[D. M. Armstrong]] (1926–2014).<ref>{{multiref|{{harvnb|Proops|2022|loc=Lead Section}}|{{harvnb|Klement|2019|loc=Lead Section}}|{{harvnb|Mumford|2003|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=kGGmBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA100 100]}}}}</ref> Alfred North Whitehead (1861–1947) ia developa [[filosofia de prosedes|metafisica de prosedes]] como un atenta per furni un descrive oliste de ambos la mundos ojetal e sujetal.<ref>{{multiref|{{harvnb|Desmet|Irvine|2022|loc=§ 6. Metaphysics}}|{{harvnb|Palmer|1998|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=ZT2pI9IMiYUC&pg=PA175 175]}}}}</ref>

[[Rudolf Carnap]] (1891–1970) e otra [[positivisme lojical|positivistes lojical]] ia formula un critica vasta de declaras metafisical par afirma ce los es sin sinifia car on ave no modo per serti los.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hamlyn|2005|p=592}} | {{harvnb|Hart|1998|loc=Lead Section}} }}</ref> Otra criticas de metafisica tradisional ia identifia malcomprendes de [[filosofia de lingua comun|lingua comun]] como la fonte de multe problemes metafisical tradisional o ia pone en duta deduis metafisical complicada par depende de sensa comun.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hancock|2006|pp=194–195}} | {{harvnb|Morris|2017|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=sfElDgAAQBAJ&pg=PA15 15]}} | {{harvnb|Baldwin|2010|loc=§ 2. The Refutation of Idealism, § 6. Common Sense and Certainty}} }}</ref>

La declina de positivisme lojical ia vide un revive de teori metafisical.<ref>{{harvnb|Broadbent|2016|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=_GSFCwAAQBAJ&pg=PA145 145]}}</ref>  [[Willard Van Orman Quine]] (1908–2000) ia atenta naturali metafisica par lia lo a la siensas empirical. Sua studiante [[David Lewis (filosofiste)|David Lewis]] (1941–2001) ia usa la conseta de mundos posible per formula sua [[realisme modal]]. [[Saul Kripke]] (1940–2022) ia aida revive discutes de identia e [[esensalism siensal|esensalisme]], e ia distingui [[nesesadia metafisical|nesesadia]] como un idea metafisical de la idea [[epistemolojia]]l de ''a priori''.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Ahmed|2010|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=dkkdCgAAQBAJ&pg=PA3 3]}} | {{harvnb|Gutting|2009|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=4WuaB_0nu8wC&pg=PA31 31–32]}} }}</ref>

En [[filosofia continental]], [[Edmund Husserl]] (1859–1938) ia partisipa en ontolojia par un descrive fenomenolojial de esperia e sua studiante [[Martin Heidegger]] (1889–1976) ia developa [[ontolojia fundal]] como un atenta per clari la sinifia de es.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Ryckman|2005|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=FI1JCAAAQBAJ&pg=PA142 142–144]}} | {{harvnb|McLean|2003|p=[https://www.encyclopedia.com/philosophy-and-religion/philosophy/philosophy-terms-and-concepts/metaphysics 550]}} | {{harvnb|Taminiaux|1991|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=kcJzeXpHctYC&pg=PA154 154]}} }}</ref> La filosofia de Heidegger ia inspira criticas jeneral de metafisica par pensores [[posmodernisme|posmoderniste]] como [[Jacques Derrida]] (1930–2004).<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Gilje|Skirbekk|2017|loc=Derrida, Foucault, and Rorty – Deconstruction and Critique}} | {{harvnb|Reynolds|loc=Lead Section}} }}</ref> La prosimi de [[Gilles Deleuze]] (1925–1995) a metafisica ia defia consetas tradisional influente como sustantia, esense, e identia par reconseta la campo en termas de ideas alternativa como multia, aveni, e difere.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Smith|Protevi|Voss|2023|loc=Lead Section}} | {{harvnb|Roberts|2016a|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=UKW5DAAAQBAJ&pg=PA149 149]}} }}</ref>

== Vide ance ==
* [[Demanda fundal de metafisica]]
* [[Lista de metafisicistes]]
* [[Teorias de Metafisica]]

== Referes ==
=== Notas ===
{{notelist}}
=== Sitas ===
{{Reflist}}
=== Fontes ===
{{Refbegin|30em}}
* {{cite book |last1=Adamson |first1=Peter |last2=Taylor |first2=Richard C. |title=The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy |date=2004 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-1-107-49469-5 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=iFMiAwAAQBAJ |language=en |access-date=7 June 2023 }}{{cbignore}}
* {{cite web |author1=AHD staff |title=The American Heritage Dictionary Entry: Existence |url=https://www.ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=existence&submit.x=58&submit.y=14 |website=American Heritage Dictionary |publisher=HarperCollins |access-date=10 August 2023 |date=2022 |archive-date=11 August 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230811074250/https://www.ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=existence&submit.x=58&submit.y=14 |url-status=live }}
* {{cite book |last1=Ahmed |first1=Arif |title=Saul Kripke |publisher=Bloomsbury Publishing |isbn=978-1-4411-9399-5 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=dkkdCgAAQBAJ&pg=PA3 |language=en |date=2010 }}{{cbignore}}
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* {{cite web |last1=van Inwagen |first1=Peter |last2=Sullivan |first2=Meghan |last3=Bernstein |first3=Sara |title=Metaphysics |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/metaphysics/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=17 March 2024 |date=2023 |archive-date=16 September 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180916103726/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/metaphysics/ |url-status=live }}
* {{cite web |last1=Van Inwagen |first1=Peter |title=Existence |url=https://www.britannica.com/topic/existence |website=Encyclopedia Britannica |access-date=7 August 2023 |language=en |date=2023 |archive-date=29 June 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230629022444/https://www.britannica.com/topic/existence |url-status=live }}
* {{cite book |last1=Van Inwagen |first1=Peter |title=Metaphysics |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1-032-40916-0 |edition=5 |date=2024 }}
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* {{cite web |last1=Vihvelin |first1=Kadri |title=Arguments for Incompatibilism |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/incompatibilism-arguments/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=1 May 2024 |date=2022 }}
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* {{cite web |last1=Wheeler |first1=Michael |title=Martin Heidegger |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/heidegger/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=11 August 2024 |date=2020 }}
* {{cite book |last1=White |first1=Alan |title=Methods of Metaphysics |date=2019 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-0-429-51427-2 |language=en }}
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* {{cite book |last1=Wu |first1=Guo |title=An Anthropological Inquiry Into Confucianism: Ritual, Emotion, and Rational Principle |publisher=Rowman & Littlefield |isbn=978-1-7936-5432-8 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=zRVmEAAAQBAJ |language=en |date=2022 |access-date=4 April 2024 }}{{cbignore}}
* {{cite book |last1=Züricher |first1=Tobias |editor1-last=Trachsel |editor1-first=Manuel |editor2-last=Biller-Andorno |editor2-first=Nikola |editor3-last=Gaab |editor3-first=Jens |editor4-last=Tekin |editor4-first=Şerife |editor5-last=Sadler |editor5-first=John Z. |title=The Oxford Handbook of Psychotherapy Ethics |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-881733-8 |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=kLQ6EAAAQBAJ&pg=PA234 |language=en |chapter=Free Will, Responsibility, and Blame in Psychotherapy |date=2021 }}{{cbignore}}
{{Refend}}

[[Categoria:Filosofia]]
[[Categoria:Siensas umana]]